1. Field of the Invention
This invention relates to data cards and, in particular, to a multiple card data system allowing a single data card to be substituted for multiple proprietary data cards. This invention also relates to an intelligent device and system for modifying, a single data card to make it the temporary functional equivalent of one of a multiple of proprietary data cards. Particular aspects of the invention relate specifically to storage of information on data cards and to data card readers.
2. Description of the Related Art
Data cards have become a ubiquitous and vital part of modern commerce and society. Data cards include financial cards such as credit cards, ATM cards, telephone calling debit cards, and other cards containing data used for financial transactions. Financial cards have been issued for customer use by oil companies, department and chain stores, (grocery stores, video rental chains, airlines and many other large and small businesses. Data cards also have been issued in increasing numbers to carry non-financial data. These include drivers' licenses, security cards, health insurance cards, automobile insurance cards, club membership cards, and library cards.
The astounding success of data cards and the ease with which they may be produced and issued has burgeoned the number of data cards held by the average individual. It is expected that the use of data cards will sharply rise to over 5 billion cards by the year 2000. For many, it is not possible conveniently to carry all the data cards which have been issued, leading data cards of lower priority to become scattered or lost. A card used infrequently may not be available when needed. Simple management issues attending an inventory of many data cards, such as when to destroy old data cards, can become an annoyance and data cards become clutter instead of serving a useful function.
Issuers of "general purpose" credit cards, such as those issued by VISA, MasterCard, and American Express, have persuaded many businesses to accept the general purpose card in addition to the credit card issued by the individual businesses. It is unclear whether the general purpose credit cards have decreased the number of data cards in circulation or have merely added another data card to the existing array.
Data cards most frequently are issued with the data thereon stored on magnetic strips. Advances in microelectronics have made it possible to embed in a standard sized credit card a chip capable of processing and storing a vastly greater amount of information than previously possible with magnetic strip technology. These so-called "smart cards" hold immense promise. For example, it is anticipated that a person's medical history may be stored on a smart card for instant retrieval as needed. Nevertheless, smart cards are not yet in wide use, are expensive relative to magnetic strip cards, and require a different card reader. On the other hand, because of their intelligence smart cards are better able to protect the data stored on them than magnetic strip cards and have a considerably longer lifespan.
Data cards generally present a number of vexing security problems. Data card security is commonly based on use of a PIN code known only to the card owner. If the data card is stolen, it is useless without the PIN code. Unfortunately, people frequently write their PIN code on the back of their data card or on a piece of paper carried in the same wallet or purse as the data card, thereby frustrating the security of the card.
Further security problems are presented by the ease with which magnetic strips on data cards are copied. Copying allows the data stored on the magnetic strip to be transferred to another data card having different identifying indicia. If the copier also possesses the PIN code for the copied data, the copier can use the copied card as would the proper owner.
Even if the PIN code is not written down for the convenience of the wrongdoer, PIN codes may be obtained by one with sufficient skills and determination. PIN codes therefore act more as a filter than an impassable barrier, keeping out most, but not all, from access to the protected data.
Smart cards present additional and unique security issues. A great deal information can be stored on the electronic memory of a smart card. However, as with any computer, the information on a smart card becomes accessible every time it interfaces with another computer. It may be that the electronic thief must contend with security walls built into the smart card such as increasingly effective encryption techniques, but persons with a sufficiently sophisticated level of knowledge may be able to breach the barriers In this sense, smart cards present an opportunity for data theft on a scale greater than existed before them.
While the memory in smart cards is large enough to hold the data of a number of service providers, e.g., VISA, MasterCard, American Express, smart cards have not yet been commercially developed to carry the services of more than one service provider. I his is probably due to a number of security problems. First, it has not been established how the conflicting security measures built into each service provider's data are to be resolved with numerous service providers' data being resident in a single smart card memory. This is an issue of to what extent the owner of a smart card may have powers in the smart card data hierarchy over or inconsistent with the security measures inherent in other service providers' data lower in the hierarchy It is assumed that multiple providers will have to reach some agreement regarding how security for each of the providers is to be handled. Given each individual provider's proprietary interest in maintaining ultimate control over that provider's information, such agreement seems unlikely.
Second, it may be essential to the success of smart cards to allow them to be remotely provisioned. This is inconsistent with the practice in the case of magnetic strip cards of requiring the data card holder to have a service installed only by bringing the card to the service provider. It is also inconsistent with requiring the surrender of the smart card when one of the services on the smart card is to be canceled. If the holder of the data card retains possession of the card, the provider's control of the information on the card becomes an issue.
Third, assuming the card is able to be remotely provisioned, the issue remains of how to reuse space in the holder's smart card as old services are canceled and new services are installed.
Fourth, there exists a commercial conflict between competitive services, some of which desire to restrict access by their customers to competing services.
Each of the above security issues is presented by the data of multiple service providers or issuers being resident in the single memory of a smart card. See Mandelbaum, U.S. Pat. No. 5,544,246.
Having multiple providers' data all accessible at once on a single card may also present antitrust issues depending on the level of cooperation between the providers
Magnetic strips on data cards are composed of microscopic ferromagnetic particles each of which acts like a tiny bar magnet. These particles are rigidly held in place by a resin binder. In the manufacturing process the magnetic particles are aligned with their north-south axes parallel to the longitudinal axis of the magnetic strip until the binder hardens. In this state the magnetic strip is effectively "unencoded." The magnetic strip is "encoded" by application of a strong localized magnetic force which changes the polarity of the particles in the magnetic strip to create a series of magnetic signatures. The series of magnetic signatures can be detected by a reader and converted into alphanumeric characters.
In a typical application, once a magnetic strip is read, the information is transmitted to a computer which must recognize the encoded data. The data encoded on the entire magnetic strip must be present for a computer to make sense of the data. A common experience is to have the magnetic strip "corrupted" by wear and tear or from proximity to a magnetic field which erases the data. For example, when the magnetic strips on two provider cards are brought into contact with each other, the magnetic field on each card can be destroyed, erasing the data. Once any portion of the magnetic strip is corrupted, the data card is unusable unless it can be again encoded.
The data on data cards must be read by a card reader. To read the data on a magnetic strip, the strip must be moved over a reader "head". One type of reader moves the card over a reader head. Another type of reader requires that the card be manually "swiped" past a reader head. In both types of readers, the head is stationary.
Both kinds of readers require a geographical coordination between the placement of the magnetic strip on the card and the location of the head on the reader. If the magnetic strip is in the wrong location, the head cannot read the strip. Hence, the existing card readers restrict the magnetic strip on data cards to readable locations. Further, any data card containing two magnetic strips would have to be read twice, the card being reinserted into the reader for reading of the second strip after having read the first strip.
Existing card readers are also too bulky to lend themselves to application in a miniaturized environment.
The value of identification using fingerprints is well understood. Recent technological advances now make it possible to "image" a fingerprint for comparison against a data bank for verification of identity. An image of an individual's fingertip is captured by a scanners transformed into a stream of digital information, then examined to ensure its quality. The unique features in the finger insane are extracted and used to compute a distinct finger-image identifier record. The finger-image identifier record is then compared with a record stored in a memory bank. A match verifies that the individual is the person authorized for the subject use, access or right.
Until recently the equipment needed to read and interpret finger images was too large to be portable. However, advances in microelectronics now allow the miniaturization of the component parts necessary for high quality imaging. Even so, in the most common application, access must be had to a fingerprint database for verification of identity. For example, NEC has introduced a "Remote Access Positive Identification- raPID" fingerprint system which provides on-site fingerprint scanning and matching using a palm sized unit. Record information captured with the raPID unit is sent via radio to a central database for comparison. Thus, for verification of an individual using a fingerprint image, the mechanics of having access to a database of fingerprint images must be resolved.
It has been posited that there may be insufficient public acceptance to fingerprint imaging as a form of identity verification because of the public's association of fingerprints with the criminal justice system. It may be that this problem is more acute when verification is dependent upon comparison of the individual's fingerprint to a remote and impersonal database.
To the extent that keying information is an integral part of using data cards, this presents a significant disadvantage to persons with disabilities such as blindness, paralysis or dexterity problems. Voice recognition technology has advanced to the point where small devices can have incorporated in them the ability to receive and act on verbal commands.